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The History and Role of a Supreme Court
in a Federal System
By W. JOSEPH WAGNER*
We in the United States are prone to think of our federal Supreme
Court as a unique institution. We tend to laud or criticize the Court, ac-
cording to our viewpoints, solely with reference to the Court's own history
and the legal, social and economic effects of its current policies and deci-
sions. Yet a supreme court presiding over the judicial system of a federal
state is not peculiar to the United States. The United States Supreme
Court is, however, unmatched by the high court of any other federation in
the dominant position it occupies and the influence it wields.
This article, in comparing the supreme courts of other well established
federal states with that of the United States, will provide a frame of refer-
ence within which the current decisions of the United States Supreme Court
-especially in the area of school integration-may be evaluated with a new
perspective.
HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE SUPREME COURTS
Whether the laws of a federal state are interpreted and applied by
state courts or a separate set of federal courts or by both of them, there
must be a federal body endowed with the ultimate authority to see to it
that the federal system be properly understood and enforced. That the
best equipped organ to perform this task is a judicial tribunal can hardly
be doubted, although the legislative branch of the government was believed,
by some theorists and politicians, to be able to perform the job.'
The United States
One of the most outstanding weaknesses of the Confederation, after the
North American colonies proclaimed their independence from England in
1776, was the lack of a steady judicial body, endowed with real powers of
adjudication, in the last instance, of controversies provided for by the law,
without the necessity of obtaining the consent of the parties to its jurisdic-
tion.
Upon the establishment of "a more perfect Union," it was decided to
make the creation of a supreme court of the United States a constitutional
mandate, and to delimit the scope of its jurisdiction, in its most important
*Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Diploma 1940, Institute of
Commercial Sciences S. Brun, Warsaw, Poland; LL.M. 1939, Univ. of Warsaw;
Certificates 19.39, 1947, Academy of International Law, The Hague, Holland; Dr.
en Droit de l'Univ. de Paris, 1947, Univ. of Paris, France; J.D., LL.M. 1953,
S.J.D. 1957, Northwestern University.
This article is based on a forthcoming book, THE FEDE.AL STATES AND THEIR
JUciARY-A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN CONSTrmUTON LAW AND ORGANIZATION OF
COURTS IN FEDR.AL STATES, Mouton & Co., publishers, The Hague, Holland. Dis-
cussion of the supreme courts in foreign federal states is more comprehensive in
the forthcoming book than in the present article.
'See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 81 at 523-27 (The Modern Library ed.) (Hamilton)
pointing out the weaknesses of such an approach.
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features, in the basic law of the country.' The number of justices and the
organization of the Court was left to be set by statutes. The first Supreme
Court consisted of six members, by virtue of the Judiciary Act of 1789.'
The number was reduced to five in 1801, fixed at seven six years later, and
increased to nine in 1837. The largest number of justices, ten, sat in the
Court from 1863 to 1866, then it was reduced to seven. Since 1869, the
Court has had nine members.' There are no indications that this number
will be changed in the foreseeable future; on the contrary, there is a tend-
ency to make it stable. It has been pointed out more than once that if the
number of justices is not fixed by the Constitution, a new majority govern-
ing the country may change previous decisions by increasing the number of
the justices and appointing to the Court persons willing to cooperate. This
is exactly what President Franklin D. Roosevelt unsuccessfully attempted
to do in his famous "court-packing" plan of 1937.' Resolutions have been
introduced in Congress to have the number of the justices determined by
the Constitution,' but no action has been taken by Congress. In spite of
the fact that the advice and consent of the Senate to the Supreme Court
appointees is constitutionally required,' the primary responsibility of the
Chief Executive in this respect has always been recognized by the Senate,
and it seems that there was only one case, in this century, where it rejected
the nominee of the President.' However, in reaching his decision as to new
members of the Court, the President must keep in mind that it is subject
to the veto of the Senate, which will conduct hearings on the matter. There
was just one instance of impeaching a Supreme Court justice: the ac-
cused was Samuel Chase, and he was acquitted in 1805. The affair had
a clearly political flavor.'
Although neither the Constitution nor any statutory enactment is
specific on the problem of appointing the Chief Justice, it was settled, by
custom, that this is the Presidential prerogative, so that the Court cannot
elect one of its members to that office.
Again, by no legal enactment is the Court required to sit in banc in
adjudicating all cases. However, this is what the Court always does. The
Court never acts in committees, even while passing on applications to grant
'U.S. CONST. art. III.
'1 Stat. 73, § 1 (1789).
'The rule is embodied today in 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
5See, e.g., Cavalcanti, The Federal Judiciary in Brazil and the United States of
America, 60 U. PA. L. REv. 103, 110-11 (1911).
6S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1941).
'In the last years, a constitutional amendment to that effect was being proposed
by Representative Dondero of Michigan. BROWN, PRoPosED AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 1947-1953 at 7 (1953).
8U. S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
'RoDELL, NINE MEN 4 (1955). It seems that the Court considers itself as having
authority to examine the validity of appointments of its justices; however, the
person challenging the appointment "must show that he has sustained or is Im.
mediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and
it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interestcommon to all members
of the public." Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).
wFor details, see WARREN, THE SuPREmE CouRT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 269
(1947).
[ Vol. 20,
1959] HISTORY AND ROLE OF A SUPREME COURT 173
certiorari." Indeed, it was suggested by Chief Justice Hughes that split-
ting the Court into chambers or divisions would be unconstitutional.' This
was his personal opinion, but at least some other justices are not willing to
disagree with him.' Anyhow, no attempts were ever made to make the
Court function in any other way than it has worked from its very estab-
lishment.
Statutory provisions about the organization of the Supreme Court are
very scarce; they are found in the first five sections of the Judicial Code."
They set the quorum of the Court at six justices,' fix the terms of court'
and the salaries of the justices,' regulate the precedence of the associate
justices,' and vest the powers of the Chief Justice in the justice next in
precedence when the Chief Justice is unable to perform his duties. " The
rest has been left -to the Supreme Court itself. The method of working of
the Court developed in a customary way and has not been reduced to
written rules, except as to some of its aspects, mostly procedural and im-
portant to the litigants, which have found expression in the Rules of the
Supreme Court.'
The decisions on the merits, reached by the Court, are usually delivered
per curiam if not necessitating any opinion, and consisting only of short
orders of affirmance, reversal, or dismissal." Others are delivered by writ-
ten opinions.' In the first years of the existence of the Court, no dis-
senting opinions were filed. It seems that Marshall was bound to disagree,
upon many occasions, with his Court once the Jeffersonians gained the
"JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 19-20
(1955). In 1921, the American Bar Association sponsored the idea of splitting
the Court into divisions. The Court oppored the idea, and a future justice of the
Court branded it as a "folly," and added: "This way out is worse than futile; it
is mischievous." Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 504 (1928).
l"Letter from C. E. Hughes, Chief Justice of the Uiiited States, to Senator Burton K.
Wheeler, March 21, 1937, in connection with the President's "court-packing" plan.
S. Em,. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 40 (1941). It was said in the letter:
"I may also call attention to the provisions of article III, section 1, of the
Constitution that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested "in one
Supreme Court" and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
t.me ordain and establish. The Constitution does not appear to authorize two or
more Supreme Courts or two or more parts of a Supreme Court functioning in effect
as separate courts."
The Constitution does not authorize it expressly, but does not prohibit it, either.
Much could be said against the conclusion of the Chief Justice.
S8ee, e.g., JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 11, at 21. The Chief Justice stated in his
letter, that Justices Van Devanter and Brandeis concurred in his view.
"28 U.S.C. §§ 1-5 (1952). Section 6, last in the first chapter of the Code, entitled
"Supreme Court," deals with the records of the old Court of Appeals, appointed
previous to the adoption of the Constitution.
'"28 U.S.C. § 1 (1952). Similarly, the first Judiciary Act of 1789 required two
thirds of the members of the Court to sit to have a quorum: four out of six.
1 Stat. 73, § 1.
"'28 U.S.C. § 2 (1952).
"28 U.S.C. § 5 (1952).
'828 U.S.C. § 4 (1952).
"28 U.S.C. § 3 (1952).
'OThe Rules in force today were adopted in 1954: they number 61. RULES OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 16 U.S. Sup. Ct. Digest (1957).
'The number of per curiam decisions increased from 45 in 1945 to 102 in 1954.
REPonT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
CoURT 151 (1955).
'In 1945, 170 cases were disposed of by written opinions, as against 86 in 1954, Ibid.
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majority in that body,' but this fact does not appear in the reports of the
Court. Then, the practice of delivering concurring and dissenting opinions
developed, and is so well established today that it is unthinkable that it
could be otherwise. In the 1948 term of the Court, for 114 signed opinions,
90 dissents were filed in 70 cases." Five years later, on 65 signed opinions,
56 of them were criticized in dissents; besides, 16 concurring opinions were
delivered.' Granting that banning the dissenting opinions would clearly
be undemocratic, that most cases decided by the Supreme Court are diffi-
cult, borderline cases," and that some dissents of today become the law of
tomorrow, it can hardly be contended that they add much to the prestige
of the Court and the weight of its conclusions or make the law certain,
particularly when the dissenter distorts the scope of the holding and chal-
lenges the soundness of its extended meaning." It seems that it would be
desirable that the justices refrain from delivering dissenting opinions in
every case where they do not agree with the majority so as to exercise their
rights only in instances of particular importance and really strong feeling,
on their part, against the reasoning of their brothers.
Argentina
The nearly one century long history of the Argentine Supreme Court
was rather stable, in spite of some stormy periods in the history of the
nation. The Argentine Judiciary Act of 1950" provides in section 21:
"The Supreme Court of Justice will be composed of five justices and one
attorney general."
The Constitution of 1863 vested in the Supreme Court the power to
'make rules for the transaction of its business," and to "appoint all its
subordinate employees."'
2Address by Prof. W. W. Crosskey, Association of American Law Schools Annual
Meeting, Dec. 28, 1955. Decisions were reported as unanimous, but Story related
that they were not.
"Address by Chief Justice F. M. Vinson, American Bar Association -Meeting, Sept.
7, 1949, in 69 Sup. Ct. V, IX.
ONote, 68 HARV. L. REv. 96, 192 (1954). Recently the tendency to deliver special
concurring opinions has been growing. Freund, The Supreme Court of the United
States, 29 CAN. B. REv. 1080, 1084 (1952).
"VINsxoN, Op. cit. supra note 24, at IX-XI.
' JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 11, at 18-19. The statement by Chief Justice Vinson,
referring to a speech delivered by Justice Douglas, that "certainty and unanimity
in the law are possible only under a fascist or communist system, where, indeed,
they are indispensable," is clearly misleading. First, it makes a virtue of uncer-
tainty of law, which is a necessary evil in all legal systems but should be eliminated
whenever possible. Second, it pays an undue homage to totalitarian systems, under
which even criminal law which should be more certain than any other branch of
law, is usually vague and subject to arbitrary application by the governing party.
Thus, e.g., a statute of Nazi Germany of June 28, 1935, introduced the idea of crimes
by analogy and made punishable acts deserving a penalty according to basic con-
ceptions of criminal law and healthy popular sentiment. Similarly, § 16 of the
Soviet Russia's criminal code made "socially dangerous acts," even though not
dealt with in the code, punishable according to provisions dealing with crimes
"most closely resembling It." Needless to add, legal rules are notoriously disre-
garded by the government in most totalitarian systems of law. See, e.g., Camp-
bell, Fascism and Legality, 62 L.Q. Rav. 141 (1946), and Marsh, Some Aspects of
the German Legal System Under National Socialism, 62 L.Q. Rav. 366 (1946).
"Law No. 13,988, 2 Legislacion Nacional Argentina 195 (1950).
'Article 100. However, the freedom of action of the Court as to Its employees was
restricted by §§ 12-16 of the Judiciary Act of 1950.
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Like most other constitutions, the Argentine basic law did not settle
the question how the President of the highest tribunal of the nation should
be appointed. In 1930 the Court adopted a resolution stating that the
previous practice of appointing the Chief Justice by the President had no
legal basis and was contrary to the principle of the separation of powers.
Thereupon, for the first time, it elected its President itself.' Today, the
new rule finds its place in a statutory enactment.' The new Judiciary
Act recognizes also the old Argentine principle that the Court sits as a
body and all decisions must be taken by an absolute majority of the jus-
tices who are its members.' Decisions are delivered per curiam, but con-
curring and dissenting opinions are rendered, too.'
Mexico
In Mexico today," the membership in the Court is set at twenty-one
justices and five substitutes. ' It sits in bane in order to decide some cate-
gories of cases, as specified by law, all those which are not assigned to one
of the Chambers, and to handle certain administrative and internal prob-
lems. ' The bulk of its business is expedited by the justices sitting in the
four Chambers into which the Court is divided, ' handling separately civil,
criminal, administrative and labor dispute cases. Five judges sit in each
of the Chambers; the presence of four is sufficient to transact business.'
By constitutional provision the Mexican Supreme Court elects a Chief
Justice from among its own members. I4 contrast to the situation existing
in the United States, the Mexican Judiciary Act contains many minute de-
tails regulating the functioning of the Court. The decisions of the Court,
in bane or in Chambers, are taken by a simple majority of the votes.'
Brazil
In Brazil, by virtue of a constitutional provision," the minimum num-
ber of justices of the Federal Supreme Court is eleven, and it may be in-
creased by law "upon the proposal of the Federal Supreme Court itself."
At present it is composed of thirteen justices. For a long time the Court
sat only in bane; today, it may sit also in one of the two Chambers which
have, in respect to the whole Court, a position similar to that of an inferior
tmAMMAEo, ARGENTInE CONSTiTU-TIONAL LAW 51-53 (1943).
8"Judiciary Act of 1050, § 21.
32Id. at § 23.T AMADEO, Op. cit. 8upra note 30, at 53.
"The situation in an earlier period is described in Clark, The Supreme Court of
Mexico and the Judicial Sy8tem of That Country, 8 GREEN BAG 203 (1896).
"'MEX. CONST. art. 94 (1917), as amended in 1944, and the Judiciary Act of 1935,
§ 2, Diario Oficial of Jan. 10, 1936.
"Sections 11 and 12 of the Judiciary Act, supra note 35.
'Article 94 of the Constitution as amended; §§ 15, 24, 25, 26 and 27 of the Judiciary
Act.
"'Section 15 of the Judiciary Act.
31d. at §§ 4 and 20.
"BRAz. CoNsT. art. 98. The origin of the Court is discussed in Dawson, Brazilian
Law and Judicial Organization, 35 AM. L. REV. 31, 38 (1901).
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judicial body." The bulk of litigation, however, is taken care of in the
plenary sessions of the Court.
Brazilian Supreme Court deliberations, in which every justice gives
reasons for his opinion and conclusions, are open to the public." As is
the usual rule in other countries, decisions of the Supreme Court are taken
by majority vote; dissenting opinions are permitted.
Australia
In Australia, the High Court consists "of the Chief Justice and six
other justices. "' By virtue of the Australian Judiciary Act, decisions are
taken either by one" or by more justices.'  In cases involving the ex-
ercise of the original jurisdiction of the Court, one justice takes care
of the question presented. In appellate cases, more members of the
Court have to sit: at least two" or three." On some occasions the Court
sat simultaneously in two Appellate cases appealed from state courts, but
this practice was subjected to criticism."
Applications for the granting of a leave to appeal to the Privy Council
must be heard by not less than three justices." The concurrene of three
justices is required to reach decisions in most important constitutional
questions.' In appellate cases, if there is an equal division of opinion be-
tween the justices, the judgments below are affirmed; in other cases, "the
opinion of the Chief Justice, or if he is absent the opinion of the Senior
J}ustice present" decides the problem.'
Canada
The Supreme Court of Canada had two handicaps, if we consider its
origin and position in the whole system of administration of justice in
Canada. First, it was not established pursuant to a constitutional mandate,
but created by initiative of the legislature; second, actually, it was not a
"supreme" court, since, down to 1949, its decisions could be appealed to
"The Law No. 623 permits appeals from the decisions of the Chambers to the Court
sitting in banc when these decisions are conflicting with each other or are allegedly
contrary to an opinion of the Court reached at a plenary session. D.O.U. of Feb.
24, 1949.
'LAFAILLm, LA COUR DE CASSATION EN ARGENTINE E'r LA NOUVELLE CONSTITUTION,
7-8 CAnrmTRS DE LE)GISDATION ET DE BIBLIOGRAPHIE JURISDIQUE D'AMERIQUE LATINE 41,
46 (1951). The quality of the decisions is questioned in de Oliveira Filho, A
Supreme Corte e o Supremo Tribunal Federal, JORNAL DE COMMxEMCIO, Mar. 19,
1950 (Rio de Janeiro).
'Judiciary Act, 1903-1950, § 4, 3 COMMONWEALTH ACTS 1905-1950, at 2387.
"Then, the High Court sits "in Chambers." Judiciary Act, § 16.
Then, the High Court sits as a "Full Court ;" it "may be constituted by any two
or more Justices of the High Court sitting together." Id. at § 19.
"Id. at § 20.
47Id. at § 21.
"Cumbrae-Stewart, High Court-Sitting in Two Divisions, 11 Ausr. L.J. 278, 279,
282 (1943).
"Judiciary Act, § 22.
t Judiciary Act, § 23(1), dealing with cases "affecting the constitutional powers
of the Commonwealth," provides that in such cases "a Full Court consisting of less
than all the Justices shall not give a decision . . . , unless at least three Justices
concur in the decision."
'Id. at § 23(2).
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the Privy Council to an extent still broader than in Australia. Thus,
actually, the Court was only an intermediate appellate court in most in-
stances.
The number of judges was fixed in 1949 at nine. Two judges had to
be from Quebec; since 1949, at least three come from that province, by
virtue of statutory provisions.' Following a well-established practice,
three other judges come from Ontario. Of the remaining three, one is
usually from British Columbia, one from the Mid-West provinces, and one
from the East.. The Court sits as a body and the quorum is five," or, if
the parties consent, four."
The jurisdiction and the procedure before the Court are regulated by
the Supreme Court Act. In matters not provided for by legislation, the
Court is empowered to make its own rules and orders,' power which was
taken advantage of by the Court."
Switzerland
The history of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, as the only judicial
organ of the Confederation, can be identified with the history of the whole
Swiss federal judiciary. A complete equality of the three branches of
government was never recognized in Switzerland, the legislature having
precedence over the two others and the judiciary being the weakest. The
superiority of the legislature was recognized in article 60 of the Constitu-
tion of 1848, pursuant to the general conviction that this was what the
democratic idea requires, the legislators being elected by a popular vote
and representing the people.' Even today, the Constitution states that
"the supreme authority of the Confederation is exercised by the Federal
Assembly. '
An attempt to establish a federal court was first made in 1832-33, but
it failed.' The members of the impotent Federal Tribunal, established
pursuant to the Constitution of 1848' and devoid of any important duties,
were, in majority, members of the legislature.' The present tribunal was
"An Act respecting the Supreme Court of Canada, CAN. REV. STAT. C. 259, § 6 (1952).
m d. at § 25.
"Id. at § 29.
rId. at § 103.
"The Rules of the Supreme Court now in force date back to 1945; subsequently a
few changes were made.
57RAPPARD, Le contrdle de la contitutionnalite des Wos f6ddrale8 par le juge aux
Etats-Un4 et en Suisse, 53 Z.S.R. (N.F.) 36a, 107a-1O8a (1934) (Swit.).
"SwIT. CONST. art. 71.
'Coolidge, The Swiss Federal Court, 4 L.Q. REv. 409, 419 (1888) (cont'd 5 L.Q.
Rrv. 149 (1889)).
'This Is what an outstanding Swiss scholar had to say about the 1848 Tribunal:
"The framers of its status cared less about Its independence than about its coopera-
tiveness. Thus, it was provided that the judges would be elected by the legislature
for a very short term of years, that they could be selected from among non-lawyers,
that they had no assured salary, and that, in consequence, they could have otherjobs at the same time .... The Tribunal was even deprived of the right to choose
its own President and its Vice-President." RAPPARD, LA CONSTITUTION FEDERALE
DE LA SUISSE 164 (1948). The Tribunal "was hardly more than a committee of
the Federal Assembly entrusted with certain very limited judicial duties." RAP-
PARD, THE GOVERNMENT OF SwiTzai.AND 23 (1936).61RAPPARD, op. oft. s8upra note 57, at 110a.
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established in 1875. Its membership then consisted of nine judges and
nine alternates.' By virtue of the Swiss Judiciary Act now in force, there
are from 26 to 28 members in the Federal Tribunal, and from 11 to 13
alternates.' It sits in departments, except for adjudication of some rare
cases as provided by law, and for expediting of its administrative matters,
where the sessions are plenary. Then, the quorum is two-thirds of its
membership."
Separate departments and chambers handle criminal, civil, bank-
ruptcy, constitutional and administrative and disciplinary matters.' To
reach a decision, the majority of votes is necessary; in cases of a split the
chairman casts the decisive vote.'
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURTS
In countries in which there is no set of lower federal courts, the work
of the federal judiciary is synonymous with that of the supreme court.
In others, the highest federal tribunal leads the way, has the final word on
the interpretation of the legal provisions, and is to be followed by inferior
courts. Therefore, the role and prestige of the federal judiciary is depend-
ent on that of the supreme court. The work of the highest tribunals falls
into one of two categories: its decisions shape the private law of the coun-
try, or have a bearing on its politico-legal life.
The United States
In no other state, federal or unitary, have the courts, and particularly
the highest tribunal of the country, attained the degree of prestige and im-
portance that they enjoy in the United States. Although in most federal
states, the supreme courts have a very effective power to play the primary
role in the politico-legal life of the nation-the power of judicial review-,
various circumstances prevented some of them from taking advantage of
this possibility to the full extent.
Because of the wide powers of judicial review, not only existing the-
oretically, but actually exercised by the courts,' the government of the
United States was called a government of judges.M  A foremost American
legal scholar stated that while in the first period of the history of the
nation, the legislative branch of the government had hegemony over the
two others, the judicial branch won supremacy after the Civil War, and
was, in turn, replaced by the executive with the development of adminis-
trative agencies in the twentieth century.' Thus, for the first time in the
history of nations, the judicial branch of the government did successfully
THUGHES, THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF SWITZERLAND 120 n.l (1954).
'Judiciary Act of 1943, § 1, 95 B.S.E.I. 167 (1944).
"Id. at § 11.
TId. at § 12, A.S. 60, 914.
06Judiciary Act of 1943, § 10(2). However, if a deadlock is reached as to an ap-
pointment, the decision is taken by lot.
'See WAGNER, book mentioned in the first note to this article, chapter VI text and
notes.
M8LAMBERT, LE GOuVERNMENT DES JuDEs ET LA LuTTE CONTRm LA LEGISLATION SOCIAE
AUX ETATS-UNIS (1921) ; BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIABY (1932).
"POUND, FEDERASM AS A DMOCARTIC PRocEsS 14-16, (Rutgers Univ. ed. 1942).
[Vol. 20,
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compete with the two others for a leading role. This could hardly be ex-
pected at the time when the Union was being established. In the "Spirit
of Laws," Montesquieu expressed the idea that the judiciary cannot match,
in importance and strength, the legislature or the executive,' and Hamil-
ton wrote that "incontestably . . .the judiciary is beyond comparison the
weakest of the three departments of power," and that "it can never at-
tack with success either of the other two."'
It was under these beliefs that the Supreme Court began to work. Its
position seemed to be weak not only as to the two other branches of the
federal government, but also as to the highest tribunals of the States, which
enjoyed a greater prestige than that of the Supreme Court." And when
Jay was asked, in 1801, to accept a reappointment to the Court, he declined,
saying that under the defective system under which it functions, the Court
would never "obtain the energy, weight and dignity which were essential
to its affording due support to the National Government, nor acquire the
public confidence and respect which, as the last resort of the justice of
the nation, it should possess.'
The predictions of Jay did not materialize, though the position that the
Court enjoys today was not won overnight. It took many years to "strug-
gle for judicial supremacy. '"' Some decisions of the Court were defied
by state courts and authorities ;6 some others, by the federal ones." In
a few other instances, the Court declined to take jurisdiction, couching
its decision on legal grounds, but actually fearing that its decision would
not be carried out." The Supreme Court and its members were subjected
to bitter attacks and criticism, wrong or just. The best merited is perhaps
that still more often than lower federal judges, the justices of the Supreme
Court lack, upon their appointment, any or sufficient judicial experi-
ence, as they are selected on the basis of political considerations." The con-
servatism of the Supreme Court is well known, but is connected, as it may
'MoNTESQUIEU, L'EsPRIT DES LOIS (1748).
"THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 504 (Modern Library ed.) (Hamilton).
71WENDELL, RMATIONS BErWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 27 (1949).
7'Kaufman, John Marshil: A Dedication, 24 FORD. L. REv., No. 3 at xi (1955).
"Title of a book by Mr. Justice Jackson, published in 1941. Of course, there can
be no question of "supremacy" of the judicial branch of the government in the full
sense of the word. The power of the courts is essentially negative; they can deny
the force of law to acts of the executive and legislature. The "supremacy" of thejudiciary should be understood as the recognition that they have the last word as
to the legality of acts.
'
0 For examples, see WARREN, THE SuPREME COuRT iN UNITED STATES HiSToRY 530,
768 (1947); SCOTT, JUDICIAL STmEMENT OF CONRovERSIms BETWEEN STATES OF
THE UNION 529 (1919).
7E.g., Lincoln disobeyed writs of the Chief Justice of the Court. JACKSON, Op. Cit.
supra note 74, at 32 and 324-27. One of the most famous cases is E. parte Merry-
man, 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861), where Chief Justice Taney,
sitting as circuit judge, issued a writ of habeas corpus to military authorities who
confined an agitator of the Confederacy at the beginning of the Civil War.
"Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) ; Cherokee Nation v. The State
of Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) ; and other cases described by the Court as
raising "political questions."
'sSee, e.g., PF,&RsoN & ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 322 (1937) ; TUNe & TUNC, 2 LE
SYSTEME CONSTITUTIONNEL DES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE 278 (1954). However, Jus-
tice Frankfurter recently asserted that "past party ties as such tell next to nothing
about future Justices." He also stated that "correlation between prior judicial
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seem, with that of the whole legal profession." That this conservatism
often resulted in an "antidemocratic" position that the Court took can like-
wise hardly be denied,' and naturally it appeared in bold relief particular-
ly in some cases holding legislation to be unconstitutional. Cardozo re-
marked: "The misuse of logic or philosophy begins when its method and
its ends are treated as supreme and final.' And in some instances, this
seems to have been the case with the judgments of the Court.
But, in spite of the fact that in some periods of the history of the Court
the intellectual level of its members might not have been high,' usually
the questions presented to the Court were given not only careful but also
intelligent consideration; and the opinions and dissents fairly reflect the
contemporary currents of thought in the nation, ably presented and skill-
fully phrased. ' The integrity of the justices of the Supreme Court was
often emphasized,' even though they might be influenced by their political
party affiliations or sympathies. '
The decisions of the Supreme Court are usually awaited with anxiety,
if not by the whole nation, by the members of the legal profession. Opinions
of the Court are being praised or criticized, but always commented upon,
analyzed, discussed and cited. Unquestionably, the prestige of the Court
is higher than that of any other tribunal in the world. And one of the
outstanding members of the Court observed that its "extraordinary author-
ity" is due to the fact that it "has found its fortress in public opinion." '
It is a historical fact that the decisions of the Court greatly con-
tributed to the creation of the American Nation out of New Yorkers, Vir-
ginians, and citizens of other States. At the establishment of the Union,
experience and fitness for the functions of the Supreme Court is zero," and pointed
out that out of seventy-five past justices of the Court (the remaining fifteen con-
temporary and relatively recent occupants of the Court were omitted from con-
sideration), "twenty-eight had not a day's prior judicial service," and that out of
twelve most famous members of the Court (Marshall, Johnson, Story, Taney, Miller,
Field, Bradley, White, Holmes, Hughes, Brandeis and Cardozo), only five had
prior judicial experience. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of
Ju8tiCe8, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 781, 783, 795, 796 (1957).
Among other voices advocating the system of appointing Supreme Court justices
not from among expert jurists, but from among persons having had experience in
public life, see McWHINNET, JUDICIAL RsvIw IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD
177, 188 (1956).
"JACKSON, op. cit. upra note 74, at 313. Besides, for a few reasons, and particular-
ly as federal states have "rigid" constitutions, it seems that "federalism tends to
produce conservatism." DIcEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CoNsmTIuoN 173 (1952 ed.).
8'See, e.g., RODELL, NINE MEN 21 (1955).
nCARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PsoczsS 46 (1921).
' JAcKSON, Op. cit. supra note 74, at XVIII. Professor Rodell, a sharp critic of the
Supreme Court, branded some justices as stupid, narrow-minded and uninformed.
RoDm.L, op. cit. supra note 80, at 8.
' JACKSON, id. at 312.
"
'See, e~g., POWELL,' VAGARIMS AND VARIETIES IN CoNSTITUTIONAL INTERPRErATION 44
(1956).
"As a well known example, the Electoral Commission of 1876 may be cited. Five
justices of the Supreme Court, appointed to the Commission, voted along the party
lines. BASSATT, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1492-1938, at 656-57
(1943).
8 'HuGHEs, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 24-25 (1936 ed.).
[Vol. 20,
1959] HISTORY AND ROLE OP A SUPREME COURT 181
it was questionable whether and to what extent national unity would be
established. The construction of the Constitution by the Court, particularly
in the first half of the history of the Union, went in the direction of
strengthening the federation and endowing it with all powers necessary to
run a great modern country. Broad constitutional clauses such as the due
process clause or the commerce clause could easily be applied, by a less
determined court, narrowly enough to thwart the endeavors of the federal
government to cement the Union.'
To the general public, the Supreme Court is better know by its politico-
legal decisions than by its role in the shaping of the private law of the
nation. Indeed, a "profoundest need" was asserted "that the Supreme
Court may be free to adjudicate great issues of government," ' and more
than once was the Court called "the umpire in the federal system.'"' The
political power of the Court is well known.' But the bulk of its business
consists of reviewing decisions settling the rights and obligations of private
individuals in their disputes with each other. And recently, one of the
justices observed that the most important task of the Court is just to de-
cide, in the last instance, legal questions raised by disputes between the
citizens rather than answer great problems of government.'
All the existing federal states except Switzerland are younger than
the United States. The constitutions of most of them were influenced by
their North American model. And the supreme courts of other federations
often found inspiration in the decisions and attitude of the United States
Supreme Court and endeavored to gain a position comparable to that Court.
Australia
Perhaps, after the highest tribunal of the United States, the Austra-
lian High Court is the one which gained in its country the most powerful
and influential position. From its very establishment, it tried to follow
the tradition of the United States Supreme Court. After fifteen years
of its existence, it was possible to say: "In the official reports of argument
heard and judgments delivered in constitutional cases in the High Court,
the abundance and aptness of quotations from decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States on cognate questions is conspicuous."
It was pointed out that the High Court was vested with the important
function of maintaining the proper balance between the federal and the
87d,. at 78. Cf. 1 WARREw, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HisToay 2 (rev.
ed. 1947).
"Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 503 (1928).
"Burton, Unsung Services of the Supreme Court of the United States, 24 FORD. L.
PrV. 169, 170 (1955) ; see also Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, In FEDERA. -
ISM MATURE AND EMERGENT 159 (Macmahon ed. 1955) and 54 COL. L. REv. 561
(1954).
"TuNc & TuNC, op. cit. supra note 78, at 196-202. RODELL, op. cit. supra note 80,
at 4 and 33, called the Court the most powerful group of men in the world govern-
ing others.
9JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 78-83
(1955). For the Importance of the Court as a law court, see the same work at 28.
"QuicK, THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE STATES OF
AUSTRALIA 99 (1919). See also NICHOLAS, THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 328ff. (2d ed. 1952).
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state governments, as provided for in the Constitution; the Court became
an "arbiter of the destiny of the component parts of the federation."" This
duty the Court endeavored to fulfill. However, the great weight of Aus-
tralian constitutional law students express the opinion that gradually the
scope of the federal power increased, at the expense of the state power;"
it seems that the two world wars were the periods during which this pro-
cess was fast, and the tide in the other direction, after the cessation of the
hostilities, could not bring the balance of powers back to the preexisting
situation. It was even asserted that the developments seem to go in the
direction of the establishment of a unitary state in Australia.'
Various circumstances contributed to this state of things which is not
only due to the interpretation of the Constitution as given to it by the
High Court. However, undoubtedly the Court substantially contributed to
this result by some of its famous decisions in constitutional cases." It seems
that the role played by the High Court, in these developments, is comparable
to that attributable to the United States Supreme Court.
The position of the High Court was from the very beginning weaker
than that of the highest tribunals of most other federations, because in some
legal questions there was, and there is still, a higher court than the High
Court: the Privy Council. The High Court, aided by the legislature of
the Commonwealth, fought a battle to gain the position of the final court
in Australia in as many cases as possible. Its fight against any encroach-
ments on its powers by other branches of the Australian government was
not less determined. It was even observed that "at times the Court has
been over-anxious to consolidate its own position regardless of the effect
of some of its decisions upon the working of the other, coordinate organs
of the Commonwealth scheme.' ''
The criticism of the High Court, proper and commendable as a con-
structive element of any progress and improvement, does not diminish the
importance of the work of the Court and the prestige it gained in the
Australian community.
Camada
The Canadian Supreme Court was handicapped, in comparison with
the High Court of Australia and the highest tribunals of other federal
'GEENWOOD, THE Fu'uRaa OF AUSTRALIAN FEDERA&ISM 58 (1946).
"Anderson, The States and Relations with the Commonwealth, in ESSAYS ON THE
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 96 (Mitchell ed. 1952); Dixon, Aspects of Australian
Federalism, 5 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 242 (1944) ; Holman, Constitutional Relations
in Australia, 46 L.Q. REv. 202 (1924) ; McWhinney, Legislative Power in Federal
Constitutional Systems-The Experience of the Commonwealth Countries, 14 LA.
L. Ray. 791, 801 (1954). The only dissent from this view seems to have been ex-
pressed by Evatt, Constitutional Interpretation in Australia, 3 U. TORONTO L.J. 1.
22, 23 (1939), where it was said that "there is neither a tendency towards, nor yet
away from, Commonwealth supremacy over the states," and that "the federal
nature of the constitutional system is still potent in Australia."
"McWhinney, id. at 810.
"See, e.g., Dixon, aupra note 94, at 242.
"Beasley, The Exercise of "Judicial Power" in the Commonwealth of Australia, 27
CAN. B. REv. 686, 699 (1949).
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states." Therefore, considering the whole work of the Court and the
position it gained in the nation, it must be said that it has no such tradition
as the highest tribunal of the United States or even that of Australia."
With the abolition in 1949 of appeals to the Privy Council from Canada, it
is to be expected that its prestige will increase.
In view of the fact that the Canadian Constitution and practice are
considerably divergent, it would hardly be possible to require the courts to
be "guardians of the Constitution." This state of things would not satis-
fy anyone. The provisions of the Canadian basic law establish a centralized
system of government, whereas the developments went in the direction of
decentralization. Therefore, many important questions of public life must
be settled out of the courts, the duty of which in the interpretation of the
Constitution is much narrower than in the United States. However, one
basic question was always submitted to determination by judicial decisions:
that of the scope of powers of the Dominion and provincial legislatures/
By construing the respective constitutional provisions, the courts gave to
the Canadian federalism the shape it has today.
During the first thirty years of the existence of the Canadian federa-
tion, the effect of the judicial decisions was to give the federal government
rather broad powers,' a result which was warranted by the wording of
the Constitution. Although in a few isolated instances some decisions
recently have gone in the same direction,' the general trend, starting in
the 1890's was decidedly in favor of provincial rights.'
The powers of the Dominion were gradually reduced, and those of the
provinces given as broad a construction as possible, until the whole division
of powers between the federal and provincial authorities was reshaped.'
The Canadian developments went in the opposite direction to those in the
United States. The role played by the courts in this process was often
criticized, and a constitutional amendment was suggested to enable a re-
adjustment of the division of legislative powers.' On the other hand, it
T See text following note 51 supra. It was often felt, in Canada, that the Canadianjudiciary's dependence on the Privy Council accounted for the fact that their con-
tribution to the development of the country was less satisfactory than that of the
courts of the United States and some other countries. Prof. C. A. Wright, Dean
of the Law School, University of Toronto, wrote recently: "The judgments of
our courts cannot, by the widest stretch of imagination, be styled as enlightening
or enlightened and in the main consist of a dreary collection of unrelated extracts
from judgments of other judges. He expressed the hope that the situation would
improve with the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council. Foreward to Mc-
Whinney, supra note 94.
ULaskin, The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadians, 29
CAN. B. Rsv. 1038,1046 (1952).
'O*SMITH, FEDERALISM IN NORTH AMERICA 108 (1923).
'See, e.g., EGOLESTON, THE ROAD To NATIONHOOD 36 (1946) ; McWhinney, supra note
94, at 796.
'TSee, e.g., Reference Re the Power of Disallowance and Reservation, S.C.R. 71
(1938), where the Lieutenant-Governor's power to veto provincial statutes was
upheld.
'MThe leading case was Atty. Gen. for Ontario v. Atty. Gen. for the Dominion, and
the Distilleries and Brewers' Association of Ontario, [18961 A.C. 348. See espe-
cially 360-61.
' 'Scott, Centralization and Decentralization in Canadian Federalism, 29 CAN. B. Rv.
1095, 1106 (1951).
lTMacDonald, The Constitution in a Changing World, 26 CAN. B. REv. 21, 45 (1948).
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was stressed that the criticism was often "misdirected and . . .founded on
a misconception of the processes involved in Canadian constitutional inter-
pretation."' As a matter of fact, it seems that judicial decisions in con-
stitutional questions in Canada followed the general feeling of the Domin-
ion's population favoring decentralization and provincial rights.
Latin America Generally
In Latin America, the supremacy of the executive branch of the gov-
ernment is marked, and the usual phenomenon is that the courts try to
avoid any conflict with the executive. This is true even when the courts
are given the power of judicial review, and the judges enjoy a long term
or a life appointment with a guaranty that they will not be removed from
office without cause. In spite of the theoretical security in office, the ex-
ecutive can usually find a pretext under which its action against a recal-
citrant judge will attain a color of legality, and if the cooperation of the
legislature is needed, it being usually controlled by the executive, no great
difficulty is presented; should it not be feasible, there remains still the
way of clearly illegal action, which no other branch of government will
be able to oppose.'
With these facts in mind, let us make a few observations about the
position of the supreme courts in the three Latin American federations.
Argentina
It seems that in Argentina the situation is better than in most Latin
American countries, and that the federal judiciary gained in that country
a considerable degree of confidence and prestige, in spite of a frequently
expressed opinion, particularly in past times, that minor judges were easily
affected by political and personal influences.' The superiority of the
federal judiciary over the provincial one is marked, the latter being very
unsatisfactory.
The important role of the Argentine Supreme Court in the shaping of
the law of the country cannot be denied. In general, the principle of stare
decisis, one of the pillars of the common law, is not recognized in civil law
countries. However, in Argentina, the principle of stare decisis is usually
followed.' The decisions of the Supreme Court present a good system of
case law, well integrated and not improvised.'0 The influence of the
United States and the century-long tradition of the Argentine Supreme
Court account for the fact that it was able to build up its prestige in the
country and, in a long struggle with the executive, to free itself from its
'
0 LaBrie, Canadian Constitutional Interpretation and Legislative Review, 8 U.
TORONTO L.J. 298, 309 (1950).
"0"'C. MACDONALD, LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 12 (1949).
'
0 RowE, THE FEDERAL SYSTEM OF THE ARGENTINE RErUBLic 107-08 (1921). The cor-
ruption of many judges appointed during the Peronist regime to various courts was
notorious.
""This in Barreta v. Cordoba, 183 S.C.N. 409 (1939), the Court stressed the Impor-
tance of precedents, citing Cooley and Willoughby, and declared that in the ab-
sence of special circumstances stare decisis should be applied in constitutional
matters. See AMADEO, ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 84 (1943).
.. Linares Quintana, Parallele entre le8 institutions politiques des Etats-Unis d'Ameri-
que du Nord et d'Argentine, 67 R.D.P. 736, 754 (1951).
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subservient position.' It was asserted that "the growth in importance
and prestige of the Argentine Court has been one of the most significant
characteristics of the development of the nation,""' and that its role in the
history of Argentine institutions was extraordinary.'
However, the position of the Argentine Supreme Court is hardly
comparable to that of the Supreme Court of the United States. In general,
the prestige of the courts in common law countries is higher than in civil
law countries; and in particular, in the Spanish tradition the executive
branch of the government stood always in the foreground."' The events of
1947 can serve as a recent example. Three justices of the Supreme Court
and the Attorney General, who in a few instances applied the old Con-
stitution in a way unfavorable to Peron's regime, were impeached and
removed from office under the pretext that they violated the Constitu-
tion.'
In the other two Latin American federations, the highest tribunals
have not attained the degree of prestige and importance reached by the
Argentine Supreme Court.
Mexico
In Mexico, Lic. Salvador Urbina, a scholar in constitutional law, as-
serted that in the sphere of public law there is in the country no judicial
power as a sovereign entity, and the Supreme Court is not fully independ-
ent because the executive branch of the government controls it.' It seems,
however, that while the Court has to bow to the supremacy of the federal
executive, it can, with the cooperation of lower federal courts, successfully
stop abuses of state governments.
As far as the activity of the Court in settling the disputes between
private individuals is concerned, there is no competition from the two other
branches of the federal government and it enjoys recognition as a good
interpreter of the law.
Brazil
In Brazil, it seems that the lack of high prestige of its highest tribunal,
comparable to that of the United States Supreme Court, is due not only
to the superiority of the executive, but to some criticism that the tribunal
merited. Thus, many Brazilian jurists complained about too frequent
reversals of its own opinions by the Tribunal and conflicting decisions
which make the law unstable. ' The Tribunal's work is much more im-
portant in the field of private than of public law, where it did not
'"WEDDELL, A COMPARISON OF EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL POWERS UNDER THE CoNsTrru-
TIONS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED STATES 17 (1937).
TA-IADEO, op. cit. supra note 109, at 55.
I:aLinares Quintana, supra note 110, at 758.
"'Row, op. cit. supra note 108 ,at 107, See also 3 GoNzAM.S CAJ.DERON, DERECHO
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGENTINE 420, cited by RouTs, LA CONSTITU'TION DE LA REPun-
LIQUE ARGENTINE 175 (1927).
"Scott, Argentina's New Conattiution: Social Democracy or Social Authoritarianism,
4 WEs. POL. Q. 567, 575 (1951).
"'Mecham, Mexican Federalism-Fact or Fiction?, 208 ANNALS 23, 32 (1940).
;"JAMES, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF BRAZIL 108 (1923).
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contribute much to the shaping of the politico-legal system of the
country.'
Switzerland
In Switzerland, the hegemony belongs to the legislative branch of
the government. "[Tihe supreme authority of the Confederation is ex-
ercised by the Federal Assembly,'"' which elects the members of the
federal executive and the Federal Tribunal, and is free either from judi-
cial review or the veto power of the President of the Confederation.'
On the other hand, the executive branch of the government was vested
with the function of the guardian of the Constitution.' Actually, this
function belongs to all three branches of government.
In the adjudication of cases, the Federal Tribunal is independent.'"
However, the federal legislature has the duty of "general supervision
of federal administration and justice.'""
THE PRINCIPLE OP JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
INTEGRATION DECISIONS
If the principle of the supremacy of the federal constitution is
recognized; if the statutes of a state are to conform to this basic law-
it is not enough to proclaim this principle; a body is necessary to carry
it into effect, and some procedure is needed to make possible the chal-
lenge of enactments contrary to the constitution.
In the United States, no constitutional provision expressly says
anything about judicial review.' This is usually explained by the fact
"'de Oliveira Filho, supra note 42. It was said, however, by a foreign observer,
after the first decade of the work of the highest Brazilian court, that Its decisions
"have been respected and obeyed by the executive and the nation, and that It has
become a forum for the peaceable discussion and determination of matters of the
gravest political concern." Dawson, Brazilian Law and Judicial Organization, 35
A-.f- L. REv. 31, 45 (1901).
'SwiT. CONsT. art. 71.
'
1 1RAPPARD, THE GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND 55 (1936).
'nSWIT. CONST. art. 102(2); The Federal Council "insures the observance of the
Constitution, the laws and ordinances of the Confederation and the provisions of
federal concordats."
'"Section 21 (3) of the Judiciary Act: "Subject to Art. 85, clause 13, of the Con-
stitution, the Tribunal decides ex officio about its competence in all questions
which are submitted to it; in the exercise of Its judiciary functions, it is independ-
ent and Is bound only by law. Its decisions can be annulled or modified only by
itself, conforming to the provisions of law." Art. 83, clause 13 of the Constitution
submits to the competence of the Federal Assembly "conflicts of jurisdiction be-
tween federal authorities."
"'Swrr. CONST. art. 85 (11), supplemented by § 21 (1) of the Judiciary Act: "The
Tribunal is placed under the high supervision of the Federal Assembly." For com-
ments, see SOURIAc, L'EvOLUTION nE LA JURIDICTION FEERAE EN SuissE 305 (1909),
and FLEINER-GIACOMETrr, SCHWITEIzISCHs BUINDESSTAATRICHT 63 (1949).
'"Justice Roberts stated that at the Constitutional Convention, In connection with
proposals to vest in Congress the power to veto state legislation, a "suggestion was
made that the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon the constitutional validity
of national or state laws would be sufficient," and that this view prevailed.
However, resolutions which the Justice cited in support of his statement dealt
only with state, not with national legislation. RoB=Ts, THE CoURT AND THE COs-
STITUTION 2 (1951).
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that most outstanding members of the Constitutional Convention took
for granted that such a power does exist without any constitutional pro.
vision to that effect.' In the Federalist, No. 78, Hamilton wrote that
it must be the duty of the courts "to declare all acts contrary to the
manifest tenor of the Constitution void,"' and asserted that the exer-
cise of this power does not establish, by any means, a superiority of the
judicial to the legislative power.'
If the executive branch of the government of any federal state were
empowered to check the constitutionality of the laws, the usual result
would probably be that this power would be exercised so as to ensure
the promotion of interests of the governing party.' On the other hand,
the frequent tendency of national courts which are empowered to review
the acts of the state and federal legislatures, is to more or less arbitrarily
declare laws they don't like to be unconstitutional and void; such a
decision can always be explained in legal terms. Often, this is the situa-
tion in the United States.
Some recent constitutions of other nations provide for special in-
stitutions and procedures to check the constitutionality of the laws. West
Germany's Constitutional Court, established by its Basic Law of 1949,
is functioning. The opposite is true in Italy, where a similar court to be
established by virtue of the Constitution of 1947 was never called into
being.
Judicial review is sometimes advocated in countries which do not
recognize it, but it is also criticized in those where it is firmly established
in principle. Even in the United States where the modern idea of
Judicial review originated, voices are being raised, from time to time,
that the duty of the courts in every case is to apply the laws as enacted
by the legislature.
One of the strongest and best-reasoned arguments to that effect, in
the early days of the Union, was presented by the outstanding magistrate
Gibson, a Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.' He argued
that "it rests with the people, in whom full and absolute sovereign power
resides, to correct abuses in legislation, by instructing their representa-
tives to repeal the obnoxious act."' It is significant, however, in light
of the current integration controversy, that even Gibson limited his
argument to review of state laws on the ground of repugnancy to the
'5See, e.g., CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 10-11 (1914) ; Saylor, Judicial
Review Prior to Marbwry v. Madison, 7 Sw. L.J. 88, 90-95 (1953) ; WARREN, THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTrrUTION 331-36 (1937); Patterson, The Development and
Evaluation of Judicial Review, 13 WASH. L. REv. 75, 76, 353 (1938). To Justice
Jackson, the power of judicial review "rests on logical implication" of art. 3 of the
Constitution. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF Gov-
ERNMENT 22 (1955).
'The Modern Library ed. at 505.
'Id. at 506. For an undermining of the importance of Hamilton's statements, see 2
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
1026-27 (1953).
mWade, in Appendix to DicEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTrITUTION 606 (1952 ed.).
'Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.) 330, 345, 348, 353 (1825) (dissenting opin-
ion).
'Id. at 355.
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state constitution; he felt strongly the necessity of judicial review as far
as the conformity of state enactments to the federal legal order was con-
cerned. Any other understanding of the United States Constitution
would, he stated, amount to a denial to give effect to the supremacy
clause.'
In the United States the federal system affords valuable protection
to the rights of the individual against capricious, arbitrary, and oppres-
sive state governmental action. However undesirable we may deem some
of the early decisions of the Supreme Court invalidating federal legisla-
tion, it is submitted that the Court has, in general, satisfactorily performed
its function of checking the validity of state action so as to preserve
the supremacy of the federal system.
It is therefore surprising that the greatest amount of criticism
against the exercise of its power of judicial review was directed at the
Court for one of its best opinions, delivered unanimously, banning racial
segregation in public schools: Brown v. Board of Education.' It can
hardly be seen how the decision could go otherwise. The furor over the
Brown case is even more peculiar in light of the fact that the decision
was merely a logical culmination of other segregation cases decided with
reference to higher education.
The problem of racial segregation in education first reached the
Supreme Court in the 1938 case of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada.'M
The Court there held that a state denied equal protection of the laws
to a Negro student in refusing to admit him to its all-white law school,
and that "the State was bound to furnish him within its borders facili-
ties for legal education substantially equal to those which the State there
afforded for persons of the white race, . . . petitioner was entitled to be
admitted to the law school of the State University in the absence of other
and proper provision for his legal training within the State.'"
In 1948, on authority of the Gaines case, the Supreme Court issued
a mandate that the State of Oklahoma furnish a Negro applicant with a
legal education afforded by a state institution, "as soon as it does for
any other group." ' There, as in the Gaines case, the state had only
one law school.
The 1950 decision of Sweatt v. Painter' held that the State of
Texas denied equal protection to a Negro student in refusing to admit
him to the state law school, even though the state furnished a separate
law school for Negros. The Negro institution offered there was patently
inferior to the regular state school, so the Court refused to formally re-
examine the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson.'TM How-
'Id. at 356.
'347 U.S. 483 (1954). In that opinion racial segregation in the public schools or-
dered by the state was held unconstitutional. On the same day in Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), similar action on the part of federal authorities In
the District of Columbia was held bad.
-305 U.S. 337 (1938).
'Id. at 351, 352.
'Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948).
-339 U.S. 629 (1950).
-163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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ever the Sweatt case presaged the key determination of the later Brown
decision, that separate educational facilities for the races are inherently
unequal, with the following language: "The law school, the proving
ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation
from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts. Few
students and no one who has practiced law would choose to study in an
academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange
of views with which the law is concerned.' '"
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,' decided the same day as the
Sweatt case, held that under the fourteenth amendment a state, having
admitted a Negro student to a graduate school, could not segregate him
from the rest of the students in regard to classroom seating, study areas,
or cafeteria tables.
It should hardly have been surprising to the nation when the doc-
trine of inherent inequality of segregated schools, suggested in these
earlier cases, was made the basis of decision and applied to public schools
at the elementary and high school level. The sudden reaction to the
Brown v. Board of Education decision is probably explainable rather
on the basis that it was the first educational segregation decision to ef-
fect any substantial portion of the population.
Unfortunately, the Brown opinion resulted not only in a wave of
dissatisfaction in the South, still sticking to its medieval ways of think-
ing by bias and discrimination, but also in outrageous attacks upon the
Court.
The campaign against the Court culminated in a "manifesto" signed
by 19 senators and 77 House members from the South, and read in Con-
gress on March 12, 1956. According to the statement, "all lawful means"
would be exercised to bring about a reversal of the Court's decision. The
opinion of the Court was branded as a "clear abuse of judicial power,"
and its Justices were condemned for substituting "their personal politi-
cal and social ideas for the established law of the land."
The most amazing passage of the "manifesto" was the following:
This unwarranted exercise of power by the court, contrary
to the Constitution, is creating chaos and confusion in the states
principally affected. It is destroying the amicable relations be-
tween the white and negro races that have been created through
90 years of patient effort by the good people of both races. It
has planted hatred and suspicion where there has been hereto-
fore friendship and understanding.
Without regard to the consent of the governed, outside
agitators are threatening immediate and revolutionary changes-
in our public school system. If done, this is certain to destroy
the system of public education in some of the states.
'339 U.S. at 634.
-339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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In a free country, everyone is free to criticize its authorities, includ-
ing the courts. Without criticism, no progress could be achieved. The
Supreme Court may be and is often wrong. However, only reasonable
criticism, expressed in good faith, is constructive. Tie vicious attack
upon the Court, carried out by the Southern legislators, is shocking as
an example of uncontrollable bias, utter lack of logic, distortion of facts,
and perversion. After all, there must be, in every country, an institu-
tion empowered to say, in the final instance, what the Constitution
means, and what the law of the country is. Rightfully or wrongfully,
this institution, in the United States, is the Supreme Court. Interpreting
the Supreme Law of the country, it says that no discrimination based
solely on racial bias can be permitted in public schools. It is hardly un-
derstandable how any citizen could, in good faith, state that this rather
obvious conclusion of the Court plants hatred where there was friendship
or destroys the amicable relations between the two races. It is much
worse if such nonsense is stated by a group of leading citizens whose
main duty is to enact laws and give a good example how to abide by the
country's legal system. The open non-abidance by the Court's decision
by some governors and legislatures of Southern states, teaching the young
generation how to disregard the law, is a sad example of the mentality
of a segment of Southern population in the United States. Another
deplorable event was that a former Justice of the Court joined in the
campaign against the decision.'
Such criticism does not merit much attention.
Fundamental to any understanding of the integration cases is recog-
nition of the fact that in them the Court merely exercised the same func
tions of judicial review which are basic to our legal system and which it
has successfully exercised for well over a century. It is the system as
such, not merely the present members of the Court, which is in question.
The system is certainly not beyond question. In fact, objective
contemporary foreign observers, analyzing the American system sine ira,
have concluded that while it has some merits it has possibly more demerits,
and that it is hardly acceptable for other countries.' Probably, the ob-
servation is right that until 1937, as long as the Supreme Court did not
know how to exercise the necessary self-restraint, judicial review, par-
ticularly in its application to congressional legislation, caused more wrong
than good; but in the last twenty years, being much more reluctantly and
reasonably exercised, judicial review has been a useful feature of the con-
stitutional system.'
On the other hand there are plenty of defenders of the existing system.
Mr. Justice Jackson said, "[W]hatever its defects, [the Supreme Court] is
still the most detached, dispassionate, and trustworthy custodian" of the
"
0Byrnes, The Supreme Court Must Be Curbed, U.S. News & World Report, May 18,
1956. The author asserted that by its desegregation decision, the Court did not
interpret, but changed the Constitution.
"'See, e.g., Rappard, 8upra note 57, at 95a ff.; H. Tweed, Provisions of the Constitu-
tion Concerning the Supreme Court of the United States, 1i THE GASPAR G. BACON
LmcTuRss ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 487, 529-39 (Boston Univ.
1953) ; TuNc & TuEC, op. cit. supra note 78, at 275-81, 299-302.
"'TuNC & TUNC, id. at 276.
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constitutional system.' It is not that judicial review of governmental
actions is perfect, but that to permit either the executive or the legislature
to control final determination of legality is open even more to abuse.
"$JACKSON, Op. Cit. 8upra note 125, at 23. Before he was appointed to the Supreme
Court, Justice Jackson took a somehow more critical view of the work of the
Supreme Court than he did at the end of his judicial career, suddenly ended by an
untimely death. See JACKSON, THE STRUGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUREMACY 24
(1949 ed.).
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